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SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 36 SPRING 1985 NUMBER 3
TRADE, INTERDEPENDENCE, AND
CONFLICTS OF JURISDICTION
GEORGE P. SHULTZ*
This is a year of some important anniversaries. Next month,
on June 6, President Reagan will pay a visit to the Normandy
beaches on the 40th anniversary of D-day. For those of us with
an economic bent, this year is also the 40th anniversary of Bret-
ton Woods-the historic conference of free nations that laid the
foundation of the postwar economic system.
The essence of these postwar arrangements was to institu-
tionalize cooperation in trade and finance in order to avoid the
disastrous mistakes of the 1930's that had exacerbated and
spread the Great Depression. The industrial democracies com-
mitted themselves to an open world economic system that pro-
moted trade and the free flow of goods, services, and investment.
They created new mechanisms of multinational action and new
habits of economic policy. The result has been a generation of
global economic expansion unprecedented in human history.
Over time, this postwar system has adjusted, of course, to
new situations. The end of colonial empires brought into the
global system scores of new nations which seek to develop and
share in the new prosperity. Oil shocks, monetary disputes, and
protectionist pressures have created stresses in the system. My
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subject this morning is another dimension of problems, often
overlooked, which potentially could be more serious than any of
the others. Ironically it is, in a sense, a product of the system's
success.
You lawyers know it as the problem of "extraterritoriality"
or more accurately as conflicts of jurisdiction. Sometimes the
United States and other countries need to apply their laws or
regulations to persons or conduct beyond their national bounda-
ries. International disputes can arise as a result; sometimes, as in
the case of the pipeline sanctions we imposed after martial law
was declared in Poland, the legal disputes reflect disagreement
on foreign policy.
My message today is twofold:
- In an interdependent world, such problems are bound to
proliferate, because they are inevitably generated by the ex-
panding economic and legal interaction among major trading
partners in the expanding world economy.
* Secondly, unless they are managed or mitigated by the
community of nations, these conflicts of jurisdiction have the po-
tential to interfere seriously with the smooth functioning of in-
ternational economic relations that is essential to continued
global recovery.
So you can see why a Secretary of State, trained as an econ-
omist, has chosen such a topic to discuss before a distinguished
bar association.
I. DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEMS
Let me give you a few examples of what I am talking about.
- An American company claiming injury by foreign compa-
nies operating in our market as a cartel may bring an antitrust
suit against those companies, yet their cartel may be permitted,
or even encouraged, by their own governments.
- An American grand jury investigating the laundering of
drug money and tax violations may subpoena documents of a
bank operating in a Caribbean banking haven-a country that
prohibits the disclosure of such information.
* In our country, twelve states have adopted the unitary tax
system, which taxes a local subsidiary not only on the basis of its
own operations but also taking into account the operations of
the corporate parent and other subsidiaries. Foreign companies
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and their governments are protesting vigorously, because such a
system can lead to double taxation.
- The Commission of the European Community, on the
other hand, is considering regulations that would require Euro-
pean subsidiaries of American firms to disclose what the firms
consider sensitive business information-plans for investment
and plant closings, for example, even including those outside
Europe.
- Finally, our allies may object strenuously when the United
States attempts to prevent foreign subsidiaries and licensees of
American companies from exporting certain equipment or tech-
nology to the Soviet Union or other countries for reasons related
to our foreign policy objectives.
These examples show you the variety of different issues that
can give rise to questions of conflicts of jurisdiction. And they
suggest why, with the best of intentions, we are likely to run into
many problems of this kind.
II. CONFLICTS OVER ECONOMIC ISSUES
The volume of international transactions has grown tremen-
dously in the last three decades. The contribution of interna-
tional trade as a proportion of American gross national product
has doubled since 1945. American exports increased from $43
billion to more than $200 billion in the 1970's alone. The value
of world trade more than doubled during that period. American
direct investment abroad as of 1982 -totaled some $221 billion;
foreign direct investment in the United States in the same year
stood at $102 billion.
One symbol of this age of economic interdependence is the
multinational corporation. The conditions that produced the ex-
plosion in trade across national boundaries have led to a similar
internationalization of industry. Thirty years ago, most Ameri-
can industrial firms conducted their operations top to bottom
within the United States. Today, those same operations are
often spread out across the globe, whether to produce compo-
nents at the lowest price or to produce goods closer to potential
markets. Today, virtually every line of trade and industry has
been affected-and advanced-by the spread and growth of
multinational enterprises.
In this environment of commercial and industrial expan-
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sion, it is not surprising that the United States-and other na-
tions-often find it necessary to apply their laws, regulations,
and policies to activities abroad that have substantial and direct
effects on their own economies, interests, and citizens. Needless
to say, our assessment of our need to reach persons or property
abroad often runs up against other nations' conceptions of their
sovereignty and interests and, if not handled skillfully and sensi-
tively, can escalate into legal and political disputes.
Our relations with our neighbor Canada provide the best il-
lustration of the potential for trouble-which, in this case, I'm
happy to say, is pretty well under control. Americans own a con-
trolling interest in approximately thirty-five percent of Cana-
dian industry. In 1982, Canadian exports to the United States
constituted twenty percent of Canada's gross national product.
Approximately seventy percent of Canada's oil and gas, thirty-
seven percent of its mining, and forty-seven percent of its manu-
facturing is controlled from abroad. Speaking from this perspec-
tive, Canadian Ambassador Alan Gotlieb has characterized our
attempts to exercise jurisdiction over persons or entities in Ca-
nada as calling into question "the ability of a national govern-
ment to impose its laws and policies-that is, to govern-within
its national boundaries."
Just after I was confirmed as Secretary of State, I traveled
to Ottawa for two-day talks with my Canadian counterpart, Ex-
ternal Affairs Minister Allan MacEachen. After our talks, we an-
nounced our intention to meet at least four times each year to
discuss bilateral and multilateral issues. We have already met
seven times, and issues of extraterritoriality have invariably
been at the top of our list. These issues range from banking and
taxation to export controls and antitrust regulations.
Canada is not our only ally concerned about these issues. In
the past year we have received more than twenty-five formal
diplomatic demarches on the subject from many of our closest
allies and trading partners. One of their major concerns is the
unitary tax, now in use in twelve American states. In my tenure
at the State Department, few issues have provoked so broad and
intense a reaction from foreign nations. Fourteen countries sub-
mitted a joint diplomatic communication to the Department of
State over this issue.
These countries-the ten members of the European Com-
munity plus Japan, Canada, Switzerland, and Australia, repre-
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senting eighty-four percent of total foreign direct investment in
the United States (that's $85 billion)-had three complaints.
They complained about the administrative burden of compli-
ance and about the potential for double taxation. And they
warned that we must anticipate adoption of unitary taxation by
developing nations who are heavily in debt and looking
desparately for new sources of revenue. As the world's largest
foreign direct investor, the United States will be a big loser if
the practice becomes widespread. Developing nations, I might
add, would be even bigger losers in the long run, since they
would scare away investors.
Although on a technical level it can be debated whether uni-
tary taxation really involves "extraterritoriality," it is perceived
that way on a political level. Thus I am pleased to see that the
Unitary Tax Working Group of federal, state, and business rep-
resentatives-established at the President's direction-has
reached a consensus in favor of limiting unitary taxation to the
"water's edge." Despite problems yet to be overcome, we think
substantial progress has been made toward finding a practical
solution.
III. NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY CONFLICTS
As controversial as these conflicts over trade and financial
issues can be, the potential for sharp controversy is even greater
when the disputes involve major foreign policy concerns. As the
largest free nation, the United States must use the full range of
tools at its disposal *to meet its responsibility for preserving
peace and defending freedom.
You all remember the case of the pipeline sanctions. When
martial law wag imposed in Poland in 1981, President Reagan
applied economic sanctions to show that "business as usual"
could not continue with those who oppress the Polish people.
We prohibited exports of oil and gas equipment and technology
to the Soviet Union by firms within the United States and by
foreign firms using American-made components or U.S. technol-
ogy. Eventually we also prohibited exports of wholly foreign-
made commodities by subsidiaries of U.S. firms abroad. This
caused a major dispute between us and our trading partners,
who complained of the extraterritorial reach of the sanctions
and the retroactive interruption of contracts already signed.
1985]
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Our Export Administration Act, which is now up for re-
newal, authorizes the government to impose controls on exports
of equipment or technology on grounds of either national secur-
ity or foreign policy. That authority extends not only to entities
within the United States but to any entity, wherever located,
that is subject to U.S. jurisdiction. We consider this to include
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms, although such authority has
rarely been exercised. The act also provides authority for con-
trols on reexports and for controls on the export abroad of for-
eign products using U.S. components or technology.
Thanks to the allied consensus on the need to keep milita-
rily useful technology from falling into the hands of our adversa-
ries, implementation of so-called "national security" controls has
not generally created problems over extraterritoriality. Each al-
lied government enforces similar controls, and policies are kept
in harmony through the Coordinating" Committee for Multilat-
eral Security Export Controls or COCOM. It doesn't make sense
to spend billions of dollars on defense but at the same time help
our adversary build up the very military machine that we are
spending the billions to defend against.
When it comes to use of export controls to impose sanctions
on foreign policy grounds, which we resort to very sparingly, no
such consensus exists. Our efforts under the Export Administra-
tion Act to compel U.S. firms outside the United States to ad-
here to our foreign policy controls have stirred up new contro-
versy. This is in part because some of our allies do not share our
belief in the efficacy of economic sanctions, in part because of
differing strategic perspectives, and in part because their domes-
tic economic interests would have been more adversely affected
than ours.
In our current effort to extend and amend the Export Ad-
ministration Act, we have given careful consideration to some of
the provisions that made the pipeline sanctions so controversial.
Specifically, the Administration supports clarifying the criteria
for controls on so-called "foreign policy" grounds, taking ac-
count of the principle of sanctity of contracts in this area. At the
same time, resolution of the pipeline dispute has demonstrated
the benefits of a cooperative allied approach to economic rela-
tions with the Soviet bloc.
When I was in private business, I was concerned about the
practice of using foreign trade as a tactical instrument of foreign
[Vol. 36
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policy. I called it "light-switch diplomacy"-the attempt to turn
trade on and off as a foreign policy device. The problem is two-
fold. First, the United States is no longer in such a dominant
position in world trade that our unilaterally imposed sanctions
have as powerful a political effect as is intended. Moreover,
America's reliability as a supplier is eroded; other countries sim-
ply change suppliers or design U.S. components out of the goods
they manufacture. The U.S. economy suffers unless our main
trading partners go along with us. Foreign aircraft manufactur-
ers, for example, are already avoiding U.S. made high-technol-
ogy navigational devices for fear that some day new U.S. export
controls might be imposed, preventing sales or drying up sup-
plies of parts.
Now that I am Secretary of State, I continue to have the
same concerns. But I know, too, that there are cases beyond the
strict legal definition of "national security" that pose a serious
challenge to our broader security and other foreign relations in-
terests. In these cases, economic and commercial interests can-
not be the sole concern of policy. Dealing with Libya and Iran is
an example; and we must be able to prevent U.S. commerce
from being the source of chemicals used unlawfully in regional
conflicts.
For these kinds of cases, it seems to me imperative for the
President to have discretionary authority to use national secur-
ity and foreign policy controls on a selective basis. Although
such controls can have painful side effects, the alternatives
available for responding to threatening international develop-
ments can sometimes have even higher costs. We have thought a
lot about the proper balance and have tried to build such a bal-
ance into the President's proposal for amending the Export Ad-
ministration Act. This approach merits congressional support.
But it is clear that problems will remain. As the world econ-
omy grows more interdependent, as the machinery of business
regulation grows more complex, as the Soviet Union steps up its
drive to acquire advanced technology that it cannot produce it-
self, the opportunity for differences is bound to grow. Any one of
the major trading countries is likely, on some occasion in the
future, to feel that its national interest or public policy cannot
be served without an assertion of jurisdiction that leads to a dis-
agreement with its partners. And, if the disputes get out of
hand, they could do damage to this open system of trade and
1985]
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investment and become an obstacle to further economic growth,
as I have said. Disputes over extraterritoriality could become a
bigger threat to our economic interests than the present con-
cerns about tariffs, quotas, and exchange rates. On a political
level, they can become a serious irritant in relations with our
allies and thus even weaken the moral foundation of our com-
mon defense.
So extraterritoriality is not an esoteric, technical matter. It
is high among my concerns as I go about the job of managing the
foreign relations of the United States.
IV. THE NECESSITY FOR A SOLUTION
It is, in fact, a matter of some urgency. Increasingly, con-
flicts of jurisdiction are resulting in defensive and retaliatory ac-
tions on the part of some foreign governments.
A number of countries have enacted "blocking" statutes
seeking to forbid individuals or companies from complying with
U.S. law or regulation. In 1980, for example, Britain enacted the
Protection of Trading Interests Act. This law empowers the
British Government to order companies in Britain not to comply
with foreign subpoenas and discovery orders, as well as foreign
laws, regulations, or court orders that threaten to damage Brit-
ish trading interests. The act also authorizes a British company
to retaliate against private treble-damage antitrust awards by
filing a countersuit in British courts.
In addition, the prospect of application of our laws to off-
shore conduct is beginning to result in new barriers to invest-
ment. Acquisitions and mergers have also been impeded, and
foreign manufacturers are beginning to seek alternative sources
of supply to replace U.S. sources that are considered unreliable.
• The threat of U.S. export controls has, indeed, inspired
foreign purchasers to design around or circumvent the use of
U.S. components in their products. An Italian firm, for example,
uses General Electric rotors in turbines it manufactures for the
Soviet pipeline project. Early this year, it notified GE that it
wanted the license to manufacture the rotors in Italy or else it
would manufacture them without GE approval by using techni-
cal knowledge developed over the years of using GE
components.
• The unitary tax has made foreign companies think twice
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about building plants in the United States. A few months ago,
the president of Fujitsu was reported in the Washington Post as
saying that his company is delaying plans to build a plant in
California to see whether that state repeals its unitary tax law.
Sony has stated that it decided to expand new U.S. investment
here in South Carolina rather than California because of Califor-
nia's unitary tax. (South Carolina, I must say, has a remarkable
record of attracting some $3.5 billion in foreign investment in
the last dozen years or so.)
- Speaking more broadly, we have had a number of sugges-
tions from friends and allies in recent years that application of
American law where it conflicts with their policies can only serve
to damage adherence to an investment principle we have long
cherished: national treatment for American-owned companies
abroad.
These may be only the tip of the iceberg. The threat of ex-
tensive application of domestic law-be it U.S. or European
law-to entities or persons abroad has the potential to harm the
fabric of the global economic system. And disputes of this kind
pose a danger of poisoning political cooperation among the de-
mocracies, whose solidarity and cohesion are the underpinning
of the security, freedom, and prosperity of all of us. It is impera-
tive, therefore, that we manage the problem of conflicts of
jurisdiction.
V. THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS
As we search for solutions, we can start by examining an
analogy from our own history. As lawyers, you have much expe-
rience with dealing with conflicts of laws among the several
states. And you remember that as this country grew from a col-
lection of "free and independent states" under the Declaration
of Independence to its status as a "more perfect union" under
the Constitution, this growth was accompanied by a political
struggle over the effort to centralize and strengthen national
control over interstate commerce.
It's not news to the people of South Carolina that the
growth of our country gave rise to a continuing tension between
the sovereign states and the Federal Government. In the eco-
nomic sphere, notwithstanding the centralizing clauses of the
Constitution, conflicts of jurisdiction arose from the states' at-
1985]
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tempt to regulate and tax the railroads in the late 1800's.
America's railroads, indeed, were an early example of multijuris-
dictional enterprises. Their growth made the United States a
truly "national" market for the first time. Understanding the
importance of economic integration, the Supreme Court decided
in several landmark cases, dealing with shipping and interstate
commerce, that conflicts of jurisdiction among the several states
could not stand in the way of national prosperity. Today, the
United States can be viewed as the largest free-trade area in the
world.
In the United States we have been fortunate that the fric-
tion generated by conflicts of jurisdiction has been eased by a
strong federal system. In the international arena, differences
among nations are not so easily resolved. As a result, what may
first appear to be a clash of legal principles can quickly escalate
into a major diplomatic incident. International law, instead of
mitigating conflict, can become a battleground until the underly-
ing dispute is eased by creative diplomacy. The need for such
solutions is becoming more urgent as conflicts of jurisdiction
multiply in our economically interdependent world.
The question we face, however, is not whether extraterrito-
rial reach should be permissible but rather how and when it
should be done. Thanks to the wonders of modern electronics,
corporations and individuals can frustrate important national
regulations and laws by transferring assets, data, and documents
across oceans with a telephone call or the push of a computer
button. In such a world, where transactions often involve parties
in several nations, rigid territorial limits to jurisdiction are, in
fact, not practicable.
Even some of the most eminent critics among our allies rec-
ognize this. Canadian Ambassador Gotlieb has stated: "It is
clear that in our interdependent world a purely territorial ap-
proach to sovereignty-one that completely separates national
jurisdictions-is not workable; some extraterritoriality is inevita-
ble and, sometimes, even desirable."
Nevertheless, it is essential that the industrialized world
find ways of containing or mitigating or resolving some of the
problems. The United States cannot disclaim its authority to act
where needed in defense of our national security, foreign policy,
or law enforcement interests. However, we are prepared to do
our part in finding cooperative solutions. We are prepared to be
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responsive to the concerns of others. If our allies and trading
partners join with us in the same spirit, we can make progress.
The first element of our approach is to strive to resolve the
policy differences that underlie many of these conflicts of juris-
diction. The pipeline dispute, for example, was resolved through
diplomacy: the United States lifted the sanctions while the in-
dustrial democracies began working out a new consensus on the
important strategic issues of East-West trade. Harmonizing poli-
cies is not easy. Our allies are strong, self-confident, and inde-
pendent minded; and they do not automatically agree with
American prescriptions.
Even where policies are not totally congruent, it may be
possible at least to bring them closer together in some areas, or
to agree on some ground rules that allow us to meet our legiti-
mate needs. Some examples include regulating competition, pur-
suing foreign insider trading in our securities markets, and pro-
tecting what we consider to be our sensitive technology. A good
case in point is the cooperation we recently received from sev-
eral foreign governments in intercepting sensitive computers
that were being diverted to the Soviet Union.
Second, where policies do not mesh, countries should seek
to abide by the principle of international comity: they should
exercise their jurisdiction only after trying to take foreign inter-
ests into account, and they should be prepared to talk through
potentially significant problems with friendly governments at
the earliest practicable stage.
Sometimes, the answer may be a formal international agree-
ment. We have tax treaties with thirty-five nations, for example,
including all the major industrial countries. I have just returned
from China, where the President signed a tax treaty that will
enter into force after ratification. These have the effect of har-
monizing national systems and fostering international com-
merce, and they usually establish procedures for enforcement
cooperation.
Similarly, we and our partners have been expanding formal
arrangements for mutual assistance in the law enforcement area.
Three such formal treaties are already in force, three more have
been signed and are awaiting ratification, and several more are
under negotiation.
We are also discussing ways to develop further our informal
arrangements of advance notice, consultation, and cooperation
1985]
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with foreign governments where appropriate and feasible. Under
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment) guidelines regarding antitrust enforcement, in place since
1967, the United States has notified or consulted with foreign
governments approximately 490 times regarding antitrust cases,
including the well-known Uranium and Laker matters. With
West Germany, Australia, and Canada, we have expanded these
guidelines into bilateral agreements or arrangements.
We have cooperative procedures as well for some of the in-
dependent regulatory agencies. The Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), for instance, participates in the antitrust notice and con-
sultation program I mentioned earlier. And the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) has entered into a Memorandum
of Understanding with Switzerland, through which we can ob-
tain information in Switzerland that we need in investigating in-
sider trading and other securities violations.
Third, we are working to improve coordination within the
U.S. Government. Within the executive branch we are studying
procedures through which other agencies inform and, if appro-
priate, consult with the Department of State when contemplat-
ing actions that may touch foreign sensitivities about conflicts of
jurisdiction. The State Department has already played a con-
structive role in assisting, for example, the SEC, the FTC, and
the Justice Department.
Fourth, we are considering the development of bilateral and
multilateral mechanisms for prior notice, consultation, and coop-
eration with other governments. In the OECD, we are working
out a set of general considerations and practical approaches for
dealing with cases of conflicts of jurisdiction relating to multina-
tional corporations. Discussions are taking place also in the U.N.
framework with both developing and industrialized countries.
We have had extensive bilateral consultations with Britain and
Canada, and we are ready to consider such appropriate and mu-
tually beneficial arrangements with other interested friendly
countries.
Such measures will not end conflicts of jurisdiction, but
they are an earnest of this country's determination to do what it
can to avoid conflicts where we can and to minimize the harm
that the unavoidable conflicts can do. The United States, for its
part, will continue to maintain that it is entitled under interna-
tional law to exercise its jurisdiction over conduct outside the
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United States in certain situations. We will continue to preserve
the statutory authority to do so. But we will exercise the author-
ity with discretion and restraint, balancing all the important in-
terests involved, American and foreign, immediate and long-
term, economic and political.
VI. PROBLEM SOLVING
The essence of our approach is to reduce the problem from
an issue of principle to a practice of problem solving. This is
because, in the final analysis, there is a higher principle at stake:
the political unity of the democratic nations. That unity, as I
said earlier, is the key to our common security, fr'eedom, and
prosperity. The system of law that we and our allies so cherish
and the free economic system that so nourishes us are under se-
vere challenge from adversaries who would impose their own
system by brute force. If the free nations do not stand solidly
together on the fundamental issues, we all risk losing much that
is precious-far more precious than the subject matter of any
particular dispute.
To solve these problems, we need creative thinking on the
part of the American legal community, businessmen and econo-
mists, government officials, foreign policy experts-and their
counterparts abroad. I know that with imagination and dedica-
tion, we in the free world can surmount these obstacles. Too
much is at stake for us to do otherwise.
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